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[p. 155] Introduction1 
 
According to Belgian law, judges have to motivate their decisions. This principle was 
introduced in the Neuf Départements Réunis, i.e. the former Southern Netherlands under 
French occupation, and it became a constitutional2 obligation when, in 1831, the Belgian 
fundamental law was adopted. Although Belgium, from 1830 on, was an independent state, 
this does not mean that the Belgian juridical system developed independently. It is common 
knowledge that, in many senses, legal Belgium, in the nineteenth and large part of the 
twentieth century, was actually nothing more than a province of legal France.3 The short 
period of the United Kingdom [p. 156] of the Netherlands under the rule of King William I, 
between 1815 and 1830, has left only a few legal traces: best known exceptions are two short 
statutes, dated January 10, 1824, on the rights of ‘erfpacht’ (Dutch) / ‘emphythéose’ (French) 
(some kind of long lease) and ‘opstal’ (Dutch) / ‘droit de superficie’ (French) (a type of right 
to erect buildings or plants on land owned by another party). Although new ‘Dutch’ codes had 
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been elaborated during the fifteen years of union between the Northern and the Southern 
Dutch provinces, these never came into force. On the other hand, there was not any effort to 
return to the old ‘proper’ Ancien Régime law either. In 1830, a new state, Belgium, was 
created. However, it continued to use the French judicial and administrative institutions as 
well as the Napoleonic codes.  
The young Belgian state also continued to use French legal reasoning and interpretative 
methods, especially in court decisions.4 A lot has been written on this ‘French-Belgian’5 legal 
culture.6 French was the language of the legal profession and French books and periodicals7 
were used at the Belgian universities, bars and [p. 157] courts. Things only started to change 
in the twentieth century. Changes came piecemeal after the First World War, when, for 
instance, an official commission was established to translate the French codes and laws into 
Dutch8, the official language of the majority of the (Flemish) Belgian citizens. More profound 
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alterations followed after the Second World War and this, to a large extend, due to the 
influence of the European9 unification process. Meanwhile, Dutch had been introduced in 
university teaching, and it is my hypothesis that this educational aspect has been of paramount 
interest for the growing influence of foreign law, other than French. I shall come back to this 
point in my final conclusion. 
 
I. Research on published court decisions 
Based on the continuous use of the Napoleonic codes and the references to French case law 
and doctrine, most authors agree on the fact that nineteenth-century Belgian legal culture was 
French. Nevertheless, little research has been done on the actual use of French law, and a 
fortiori of other foreign law, by the Belgian [p. 158] courts. There are almost no publications 
on the factual use of the different sources of law by the judges.10 I have tried to fill up a little 
bit of this gap by sampling some five hundred court decisions.  
Before drawing some conclusions from this research, some remarks have to be made on the 
research method used. I have only looked at published court decisions, and did not make use 
of judicial archives. This leads to, at least, two dangers of interpreting the data. First, one must 
always ask oneself why a certain court decision is published: is it because it is representative 
for what courts normally do, or is it, quite on the contrary, precisely because it is an odd 
decision? Sometimes, a note under the decision is explicit on this point, but this is only very 
rarely the case. Another difficulty with these published materials is that, again with only very 
rare exceptions, only the argumentation (often not complete) and decision of the court itself 
are given, not the pleadings of the parties. Although a diligent judge answers the arguments of 
the parties, when the court does not use arguments of foreign law, one cannot be certain that 
the parties did not use arguments based on foreign law. 
Second, as matters such as criminal and fiscal law are very legalistic, obliging the judge to 
apply the legal rule in a strict sense, it is very doubtful whether a judge should also apply 
arguments of foreign law in these kind of cases. Other branches of public law are hardly 
elaborated in the nineteenth century. The administrative court of the Council of State was only 
installed in 1946 and the Constitutional Court, actually its predecessor the Court of 
Arbitration, was a creation of the 1980s, as a consequence of the ‘defederalisation’ of 
Belgium.11 New branches like environmental, social security, medicine or sports law are of 
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 One important exception is E. Van Dievoet, Het burgerlijk recht in België en in Nederland van 1800 tot 1940. 
De rechtsbronnen, Antwerp 1943. 
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 In the decisions of these ‘new’ courts, the reasoning is stated more clearly than in the other old supreme court, 
the Court of Cassation. Part of the explanation for this difference is in the fact that being created more than a 
course undiscovered in the oldest investigated periods. For this reasons, court decisions were 
examined for three issues of private law. The first topic is the real right of ‘servitude’ 
(easement or charge on real estate), ruled by the Napoleonic Code (today art. 637 – 710bis), 
almost unchanged at this point since its introduction in 1804; this means, of course, that one 
might expect an important influence of French case law and doctrine. A second topic is the 
right of long lease, aforementioned, introduced only in the post- and even anti-French period 
of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands. Does this bring along a possible influence of 
Dutch law? A third topic is neighbour nuisance (and abuse of rights12), a problem not legally 
regulated at all, [p. 159] but created by Belgian jurisprudence and, in the first place, by the 
Belgian Court of Cassation.13 Did this court get any inspiration from abroad? 
For each of these topics, I searched for all relevant cases in the legal periodicals14, using the 
list of headwords at the end of each year. The most important source here is the Pasicrisie, a 
yearly collection of sentences. Until 1998 there were four volumes a year, containing case law 
of the Court of Cassation (I)15, of the courts of appeal (II), of the courts of first instance (III), 
and of the Council of State, as well as of the justices of the peace (IV).16 The Pasicrisie only 
publishes case law. On the other hand, there are several periodicals publishing doctrine as 
well as case law. I also sampled La Belgique Judiciaire17 (starting 1842) and the Journal des 
Tribunaux (starting 1881), two Belgian periodicals published in French. Rechtskundig 
tijdschrift voor (Vlaamsch) België (only starting 1897), the only nineteenth-century Flemish 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
century later, the French influence has been diminished. On the other hand, especially for what concerns the 
Constitutional Court, the aforementioned influence of the Strasbourg Human Rights Court is paramount. 
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154) is referring to, without, at that moment, a general principle on the matter being accepted: “Commet un acte 
illicite et peut être passible de dommages-intérêts celui qui n’use de son droit que pour nuire à un tiers, sans 
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(ed.), Honderdvijftig jaar rechtsleven in België en Nederland 1830 – 1980. Preadviezen uitgebracht voor een 
colloquium georganiseerd door de juridische faculteiten van de universiteiten van Gent en Leiden, Gent, 5 – 7 
november 1980, Leiden 1981, p. 35 – 52; S. Stijns, H. Vuye, Zakenrecht. 4. Burenhinder, in Beginselen van 
Belgisch privaatrecht, V, Antwerp, 2000, especially the pages 1 to 119 for the historical part. 
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reviews in Belgium (1763 – 2004): instruments of legal practice and linguistic conflicts, in M. Stolleis, Th. 
Simon (ed.), Juristische Zeitschriften in Europa, Frankfurt am Main 2006, p. 343 – 367. Heirbaut talks about “the 
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nineteenth century, Van Dievoet, De rechtsbronnen, p. 307. 
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 While in France the justices of the peace were suppressed in 1958, in Belgium they still exist and their 
competences grew larger, S. Dauchy, S. Humbert, J.-P. Royer (ed.), Le juge de paix. Actes de la table ronde 
tenue à Lille le 22 mars 1992, Villeneuve d’Asq 1995; J.-P. Nandrin, Justice de conciliation, proximité et carte 
judiciaire de 1830 à nos jours. Une comparaison franco-belge, in Revue interdisciplinaire d’études juridiques 
1997, p. 85 – 102; J.-P. Nandrin, La justice de paix à l’aube de l’indépendance de la Belgique (1832 – 1848). La 
professionnalisation d’une fonction judiciaire, Brussels 1998; K. Velle, Het Vredegerecht en de 
Politierechtbanken in België (1795 –1995). Organisatie, bevoegdheden en archiefvorming, Brussels 1995. 
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 Although the subtitle of this review was ‘Gazette des tribunaux belges et étrangers’, mainly Belgian and 
French cases were published. The editors claimed they would also publish case law from the Netherlands and 
Germany, but the foreign cases actually were limited to Swiss, Italian and Luxemburg, namely three countries 
where the French codes were used. 
periodical18, was of no use, as it only published decisions of lower criminal courts. There was 
no rule, at that time, obliging parties or judges to use Dutch in the lower and higher civil 
courts. In the court decisions published in these periodicals and addressing one of the subjects 
mentioned, I sought refer-[p. 160]ences to foreign law. It might, of course, be possible that a 
judge was implicitly influenced by foreign law, but this is impossible to prove. On this very 
point, it must be noted that, “following the French tradition, the reasons stated in Belgian 
judicial decisions are rather limited”.19 
Finally, it has to be pointed out that, if I sought explicit references to foreign law in Belgian 
cases, these cases are really ‘national’. This excludes, on the one hand, cases of international 
private law, where foreign law is anyhow applicable, and, on the other hand, ‘old’ cases, 
dating from before 1830, which by a correct temporal application of the law, have to be 
solved by old rules. This ‘old’ law very often is customary law or, in case of absence of a 
customary rule, Roman law. At this last point a very interesting evolution has been described 
by Georges Macours.20 He has discovered that, during the nineteenth century, Roman law was 
very often quoted in court decisions, most of the time as some kind of doctrinal authority and 
linked with an argument of equity. If, on the other hand, old law had to be applied, because of 
the principle of non retroactivity of the Napoleonic Code, then Roman law comes into the 
picture, because most codified customs declare that Roman law is to be used for all problems 
not handled by the custom itself. What Macours discovered is that in the first decades of the 
Belgian independence, Roman law played this subsidiary role immediately, whereas, after the 
middle of the nineteenth century, it degraded to a sub-subsidiary system, applied only when 
the common general custom of the region, as a subsidiary system, did not supply any solution. 
To a large extent, this evolution is demonstrated by the fact that at university a new course on 
the old customary law was introduced in 183521 and that some legal history writings, 
especially the magnum opus of Defacqz22, drew the attention of the jurists to the existence of 
some kind of old ‘national’ law.23  In the same period, the Royal Commission for the edition 
of the old laws and ordi-[p. 163]nances of Belgium, in which several higher magistrates 
played an important role, was founded. Let us not forget that at that very moment the young 
independent state of Belgium was looking for its own identity! 
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 G. Macours, De visie van de Belgische 19de-eeuwse rechtspraak op de subsidiare rol van het oude Romeinse 
recht. Een verkennend onderzoek, in Stevens, Van Den Auweele, ‘Houd voet bij stuk’, p. 253 – 289. 
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 R. Verstegen, L’enseignement du droit en Belgique. Evolution de la législation aux XIXe et XXe siècle, in 
Stevens, Van Den Auweele, ‘Hout voet bij stuk’, p. 182. Compare this with the contrary position of the old 
‘Flemish’ law in the jurisdiction of the Parlement de Flandre after the introduction of the 1679 decree of Louis 
XIV on the compulsory teaching of French law in his whole realm, described by Serge Dauchy and Véronique 
Demars-Sion in their contribution to this book. 
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 E. Defacqz, Ancien droit Belgique, Brussels 1946. 
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 It is this same influence of legal teaching, I have also met in my own investigation; “D’un monopole du droit 
romain à une suprématie contestée du droit civil”, Verstegen, L’enseignement, p. 176 – 183. 
II. References to foreign law, other than French, are non-existent 
A first conclusion after having looked into several hundreds of court decisions is that, 
regardless the subject of the decision and regardless the fact that this subject might be 
regulated by the (Napoleonic) civil code, any reference to ‘foreign’ law, if existing, is a 
reference to French law. 
There is, however, quite an evolution in this use of French law.24 In the first years of Belgian 
independence, judges were rather curt in motivating their decisions. From the 1850s onwards, 
court decisions were more broadly motivated, with many references to the preparatory works, 
for instance, but there was not yet any influence of the upcoming Exegetical School. The 
influence of the Exegetical School may already be felt in the pleadings of the parties, but not 
yet among the judges of the 1830s to 1850s.25 If the court felt the need to link its decision to 
tradition, references were made to Roman law26, but above all to French case law and French 
authors, especially to Merlin de Douai.27 
In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the influence of the Exegetical school became 
more important, for example advocates and judges tried to avoid the use of general principles, 
like good faith and equity. The manual of François Laurent, Belgium’s shining star of the 
Exegetical School, was on every advocate and magistrate’s desk. Still, the most cited authors 
were Pothier, Merlin and Dalloz. In short, the influence of French doctrine remained 
paramount. Nevertheless, in [p. 162] decisions of the Court of Cassation, no explicit reference 
was made to other sources than the Belgian legislation.28 Judgments of lower courts on the 
other hand cited French and Belgian case law and doctrine, although also in a rather scarce 
quantity. Anyhow, if the edition committee of the Pasicrisie can be relied on, Belgian judges 
were inspired by French case law. 
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 At this point I fully confirm the findings of Van Dievoet, De rechtsbronnen, published in the 1940s. 
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 D. Heirbaut, Les juges belges face au Code civil aux 19ème et 20ème siècles: l’exemple des troubles de 
voisinage, in B. Dölemeyer, H. Mohnhaupt, A. Somma (ed.), Richterliche Anwendung des Code civil in seinen 
europäischen Geltungsbereichen ausserhalb Frankreichs, Frankfurt am Main 2006, p. 263. 
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 This means that I cannot agree with Heirbaut, Storme, The Belgian Legal Tradition, p. 11, when they write: 
“around 1830, in a second generation, things changed. The old law was still quoted, but it had lost its prestige. In 
the next generation, from the 1860s, references to the old law disappear almost completely.” Also Van Dievoet, 
De rechtsbronnen, p. 297, pointed out that in the 1830’s, with still some elder judges educated in the Ancien 
Régime, references to the Napoleonic codes were illuminated with comparisons to the proper old legal order. 
27
 Van Dievoet, De rechtsbronnen, p. 309; on Merlin and his works, see H. Leuwers, Merlin de Douai (1754 – 
1838). Un juriste en politique, Paris 1996 and J.-J. Clère, Merlin Philippe-Antoine, dit Merlin de Douai, in P. 
Arabeyre, J.-L. Halpérin, J. Krynen (ed.), Dictionnaire historique des juristes français, XIIe – XXe siècle, Paris 
2007, p. 559-561. 
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 Only in his third period of investigation, 1931 – 35, Van Dievoet, De rechtsbronnen, p. 341, found out that 
judges give more references to former decisions and doctrine. 
Although French law was indeed quoted frequently, not all French interpretations were 
accepted.29 Regarding ‘servitudes’, charges on real estate, the Belgian judges seemed to apply 
the Napoleonic rules more freely than their French colleagues, especially by trying to rely as 
much as possible on old customary rules. The right to step on a neighbour’s land to use a 
ladder to work on one’s own house, for instance, is an old customary rule, not mentioned in 
the Code civil. According to French jurisprudence it was abolished, but in Belgium, it 
survives. As the inspiration for this matter is found in the proper national legal history and not 
one reference to foreign law was made in seventy years (1830 – 1900) of published case law, 
one must conclude that, concerning ‘servitudes’, foreign influences, other than French, were 
non-existent in the motivation of the nineteenth-century judges. 
Let us then turn to the subject of neighbour nuisance. The actual theory of the balance of 
property rights was ‘eventually’ established, only in 1960, by the Belgian Court of Cassation. 
In the nineteenth century, the Belgian supreme court, first tried to solve the problem of the 
hiatus in the Code civil by continuing to apply the Ancien Régime law. This was, on the one 
hand, a variety of customary rules on neighbour rights and duties, and on the other, mainly the 
general prohibition of ‘immissiones’, derived from the Digest rule D.8.5.8.5: in suo enim alii 
hactenus facere licet, quatenus nihil in alienum immittat.30 The rule was regarded as a general 
principle and acceptable as argument in court as some kind of written ratio. 
[p. 163] In the middle of the nineteenth century, judges did their best to frame this ancient law 
within the Code civil framework. In the judge’s view, it was not prohibited to use this old law, 
because, although not explicitly mentioned in the Napoleonic code, it was in conformity with 
it. More exactly, the Roman law prohibition of immissiones was accepted to be in harmony 
with articles 544 and 1382.31 It is highly likely that the attention given to the code may be 
seen as an expression of the growing influence of the Exegetical School. 
After the 1860’s, explicit references to Roman law became very scarce and, if there were still 
any reference to older authors, this was commonly nothing more than a single reference to the 
French author Pothier. Courts sufficed by referring to their own and especially Cassation case 
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 Van Dievoet, De rechtsbronnen, p. 377-391. In some cases identical legal provisions are interpreted 
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immittere, sed minturnenses ei ex conducto teneri: agique sic posse dicit cum eo, qui eum fumum immittat, ius ei 
non esse fumum immittere. ergo per contrarium agi poterit ius esse fumum immittere: quod et ipsum videtur 
aristo probare. sed et interdictum uti possidetis poterit locum habere, si quis prohibeatur, qualiter velit, suo uti. 
31
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law. Even contemporary authors were not cited. References to foreign legal systems were 
completely non-existent.32 
For all three topics investigated, we clearly can conclude that there was a complete lack of 
non-French foreign influence on nineteenth-century Belgian court decisions. Any other 
foreign influences cannot be found. 
 
III. Not only case law, but a general ‘legal culture’ 
Many other sources confirm the trend revealed in the published case law. In their well-known 
manual for lawyers, Duchaîne and Picard33, for instance, give advice on what young lawyers 
should learn: general repertories like the French Dalloz (adapted for Belgium), Belgian series 
of case law and “après avoir épuisé la jurisprudence belge, on passe à la jurisprudence 
française”.34 And even in the 1990s, an elementary bibliographical guide to Belgian law, still 
refers to “French classical manuals of civil law, still useful in the Belgian legal system”.35 
‘Genetically’ [p. 164] speaking, references to French law were of course very normal in 
Belgium, given the paramount influence of the French legislation and organization introduced 
between 1795 and 1815. But how can one explain the kind of fear Belgian nineteenth-century 
judges had for taking elements of foreign law into account when motivating their decisions? 
As I mentioned earlier, it seems that the main reason has to be found in legal education.36 The 
judicial magistrates in the 1830 newborn state of Belgium, had, with only some rare 
exceptions, all been taught the French Napoleonic legislation in the Brussels law school, 
established in 1806. During the nineteenth century the prominent role of Roman law in legal 
education was substituted by the civil law as laid down in the Napoleonic monument of 1804. 
The Exegetical School considered it to be an exclusive source of law.  
Concerning nineteenth-century legal education, it must be stressed that there was absolutely 
no place for (an introduction to) comparative law in the university program. The proposal to 
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create a course of comparative law had been debated in 1889, but was rejected by 
parliament.37 
And there are more reasons. If foreign influences had a chance, it was to a great extent via 
comparing authors. In the nineteenth century though, not only the role of foreign law, but also 
the influence of doctrine as a whole, was very weak. In his thesis on the Exegetical School, 
Bouckaert concludes that there was some kind of “divorce” between doctrine and case law.38 
At this point, the exemplary role of the supreme court, the Cour de Cassation39, must be 
underlined. Its decisions were very briefly motivated and only refer to [p. 165] legislation. If 
the Court did not refer to foreign law in its decisions, as today, it often does so in its annual 
reports, where the public ministry of the court dedicates a chapter to proposals de lege 
ferenda. To understand the (briefly motivated) decisions better, one should also always 
consult the more detailed advices of the proctor- or advocate-general. The, often very 
extensive, conclusions of the public ministry contain many references to Belgian and French 
case law and doctrine.40 
Moreover, there was a strong general influence of French culture outside the legal and judicial 
environment. The nineteenth-century Belgian elite is French-speaking and even Francophile. 
Jurists, especially advocates and magistrates were part of this elite and regarded the French 
culture as the sovereign one. Let us not forget that in the nineteenth century the struggle for 
self-determination of the Flemish people was just starting. It was only through article 49 of 
the law of April 10, 1890, sixty years after the independence, that certain categories of 
magistrates were supposed to have some rudimentary knowledge of the Dutch language. And 
it was also just in the last decade of the nineteenth century that the first Flemish law review 
saw the light of day. 
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Finally, one must remember that, until the end of the nineteenth century, there was no real 
theory of the formal sources of law. National legislation was to be applied, that was all. Could 
a judge refer to foreign law when he was confronted with a hiatus in national law? For the 
nineteenth century this seems certainly not to have been the case (keeping well in mind that, 
for the Belgian jurist, French law was not foreign). Even in the French system it is admitted 
that the law can not foresee every material problem in detail. Very often, referring to the 
discours préliminaire of Portalis, the existence of a hiatus in the law was admitted.41 To fill it, 
one can refer to customs and usages, to case law, to writings of scholars, or to legal [p. 166] 
maxims.42 Before the Second World War, Belgian scholars never admitted that foreign (other 
than French) law could be instructive.43 
 
IV. Change after the Second World War 
After the War everything changes drastically,44 especially due to the European (and Benelux) 
context. Lots of ‘foreign’ rules were first of all introduced from a supranational or 
international level but with direct effect on the member states’ citizens. The globalization of 
trade and everyday life brought along many ‘clashes’ with foreign legal systems and these 
underlined the need to get to know the other systems better. After the Second World War, 
thanks to specifically the Belgian-American Educational Foundation, many scholars studied 
for some period abroad. From the 1980s onwards, the exchange of law students has increased 
enormously thanks to the European Union Erasmus and Socrates programs.  
Today, looking over the hedge has become a normal thing to do for a jurist. Both scholars and 
legislators seem to be very open to influences from abroad. Magistrates still, however, seem 
to be afraid to refer explicitly to foreign sources. They certainly never quote them as a direct 
source, neither as a guiding principle nor as ratio decidendi. And if courts do refer to foreign 
law, it is still, certainly in matters of private law, to the French system at first.45 Even the 
recently created Constitutional Court, although there is some international tradition in the 
motivation of constitutional findings, is not fond of referring to other constitutional or 
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international human rights courts.46 However, Flemish courts – i.e. Belgian courts situated in 
the Flemish speaking region or in Brussels, the bilingual capital, and using Dutch in their 
procedures – seem to be more receptive to foreign inspiration. Due to the language, Dutch 
and, to a lesser extent, German law is referred to. Dutch legal [p. 167] figures like 
‘rechtsverwerking’47 or ‘marginale toetsing’48 are used in Flemish court decisions. They are 
not at all, or at least to a much lesser extent, used by French speaking Belgian judges. This is 
an indication of the fact that the ‘Belgian’ legal culture is being split up into a Flemish and a 
French one.49 The same statutory provisions are interpreted differently in the French speaking 
South than in the Flemish (officially ‘Dutch’) speaking North. Just one picturesque example: 
graffitti painting on the walls of private houses is punished by Flemish judges under a penal 
statute on ‘damage to fences’, whereas most Walloon judges do not construe this rule in the 
same broad sense, and thus, do not condemn for the same offence. 
 
Conclusion 
“If anything, the attitude of Belgian law practitioners towards foreign law is just one more 
proof of their pragmatism. Foreign law was at first dominant because there was not enough 
Belgian law to fall back on. This is clear for French law in the nineteenth century, but also for 
Dutch law in Flanders. As soon as more Belgian material became available foreign law was 
relegated to the sidelines. What foreign law is used may be determined by political factors, 
but most of all by language and availability. Belgian lawyers like to read what they can find in 
their own country and in a language they understand, French in the past, French or Dutch 
nowadays. So far their attitude is determined less by a ‘national legal tradition’, than by a 
pragmatic laziness, though it would be better to say that this is their national legal tradition.”50 
“For law practitioners, foreign law exists only in so far as it can be accessed in the 
publications of Belgian authors”.51 If this is still the case at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, how much more is it true for the nineteenth, when the young Belgian state had to 
build up its own national system on French foundations! 
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